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THE AFGHAN FRONTIER.
TEE SUBSTANCE OF A SPEECH NOT DELIVERED
BY

S I R G. C A M B P E L L .

AFTERthe

announcement that the Government
proposed to retain the routes between Afghanistan
and India recently occupied by our troops, I obtained
by ballot a place for the following motion : " To call
" attention to the difficult and expensive character
" of the frontier now occupied on the north-west of
" India; and to move, That, unless Her Majesty's
" Government are prepared to occupy Ghuznee
" and Cabul, it is not desirable to entangle Her
" Majesty's Army in the rery mountainous country
" between the Upper Punjaub and those places,
" which is entirely without lateral communications
'&and inhabited by independent tribes never eon'' quered;" but owing to the unexpected effect of
a technical rule I was not able to move it. Meanwhile the subject has grown in my mind, beyond
the reasonable limits of a speech. I have therefore
reduced my views to writhg, and the result is
printed with this. I n case I should succeed in
getting on my motion, I hope those who may care for the subject will take this as rend.

G. C.

May 15, 1879.

Pri~ted,for Private Circulation
BY

EDWABJ) STANFORD, 56, GHARING CROSS, S.W.
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IT seems strange to the generation that learned

-3'>

the lessons of the first Afghan war, then sunk so
deep into the national heart, that a second similar
war should have been waged for precisely the same
object, namely, the establishment of a friendly
power on the north-west frontier of India. Then, as
now, we sought to establish such a power by fair
means or foul-by persuasion if possible, and failing
that, by force, But so it is : we have' embarked
in such a war, and we must face the questions
involved in it.
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THE SITUATION BEFORE THE WAR.
Before this war I have often expressed my own
views regarding the north-west frontier; they may
be put in very brief compass. I have always
thought and said that if the mountains of Afghanistan had been occupied by a people in any degree
resembling those of the Himalayas,-if the Afghans
had in any degree resembled in character -the
people of Cashmere or of the hill country of the
1

t
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Hiangra, Sirnln, or Iiulnaon districts, or even those
of Nepaul-I should have thought it extremely
desirable that Fve should in some shape occupy that
country and so complete our defences ; but we
know by painful experience that the Afghans are a
people of a totally different character-turbulentbred from infancy to the use of arms-and with a
passion for independence in which they are exceeded
by no people in this world. This love of independence is such as to make them intolerant, not
only of foreign rule, but almost of any national,
tribal or family rule. They are a people among
whom every man would be a law unto himself.
Experience has shown, too, that these traits are
not of a passing kind ; the Afghans are not to be
tamed by subjection and peace ; nothing induces
them t o surrender that love of independence which
seems to be the essence of their nature. That
being the character of the people occupying so
difficult and inaccessible a country, I have thought
that the difficulties and expense of any attempt to
meddle with that country far outweigh the advantages. I have thought, too, that the passion for
independence of a people occupying such a country
is the best safeguard of our frontier, so long as the
Afghans ha\-e reason to think that we, taught by
experience, are less aggressive and less likely to
encroach upon them than their other neighbours.
Of these neighbours the most formidable are no
donbt the Russians. Some day, possibly, the
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Russians may be formidable both to Afghanistan
and to India ; but at present, as I have always
said, separated as they are in Turkestan from their
resources by immense and pathless deserts, they
certainly are not dangerous to us and cannot be
dangerous till they have established themselves
much more thoroughly, and have constructed railways and other means of communication to the
foot of the Afghan mountains on their side, as completely as we have constructed or are constructing
such communications on our side. That being so,
I have said that we may well play a waiting game;
that it is not for us to fly t o dangers and expenses
which are certain in order t o avoid future dangers
which are uncertain. For it is not certain that
Russia will hold together for another fifty years as
a great military empire ; that she will establish a
complete dominion in Central Asia; that she will
find the means of constructing great communications in vast territories which are as unproductive
as India is productive. I think that recent events
in RGssia go very far indeed to fortify this view.
is evidently a great seething and fermentation there which may any day lead to revolution
and disruption, and must at any rate greatly
hinder the development of a strong aggressive
power.
No doubt it is in every way most desirable that
we sllould be on friendly terms with the Afghans.
It always is desirable that we should cultivate
1"

ere

friendly relations with our neighbours -and
I
would certainly cultivate those relations with the
Afghans, as far as the tribal divisions among themselves and the complications and uncertainties of
bheir mode of government mill permit. The instability of 811 Afghan rule and Afghan rulers is,
however, such that I confess that I did not like
even the approaches which Lord Lawrence and
Lord Mayo made towards political intimacy with
the ruler of Cabul. T,ooking t o the position of
that potentate and to the Afghan character, I have
thought that for political purposes it would be
better to leave him to come to us when he wanted
our countenance and assistance, rather than that
me should show our anxiety to deal with him.
When you appproach an Afghan to make terms
with him, you are very apt to turn his head, and
you find the more he gets the more he wants.

THE PRESENT SITUATION.
Recent events have no doubt very much altered
the situation. Whether one may or may not
approve of the steps by which the present war was
brought about, that war is a fact which we must
take into account in dealing with this question.
Looking at the enormous difficulties aad expense
of n permanent occupation of Afghanistan, I still
think that it would be better t,hat me should return
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i o our own Indian border ; but I admit that it
would now require very great moral courage to do
this. The difficulties of our position have been
immensely increased by what has lately passed;
and if before this war there were arguments in
favour of an advance, no doubt those arguments
are now immensely strengthened. We have come
more into collision with the independent tribes than
with the ruler of Cabul, and things have passed
which must go very far to create among those
tribes a feeling of burning hostility towards us.
We have caused the breaking up of the government
established at Cabul, such as it mas ; and we seem
to have insisted on lopping off further portions of
the Csbul territory,-a measure which must very
greatly increase the difficulty of any ruler of
Cabul to exercise any semblance of power over the
country at large. After what has recently passed
we must expect that the Afghans, for a very long
time to come, will think that the Russians are a less
evil than ourselves, and as against us they will be a t
any time ready to throw themselves into the arms
of Russia. Above all, what I fear is that, whereas
up to this time the Afghan tribes are provided'with
nothing better than the old-fashioned firearms, it
can hardly be but that in these days of cheap arms
of precision7 which enterprising traders are so
ready to disseminate over the world, they must
before long become possessed of such arms. Even
if peace and the semblance of political friendliness

.
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should be maintained between the Russiaas'and
ourselves, we can hardly hope that the Russians
mill or can stop the traffic in arms for our benefit.
I colifess that I think the strongest argument for
deal*
with the Afghans at the present time is
that me tnay do so before they obtain arms of precision. Under these circumstances, I a m not
sanguine enough to hope that Her Majesty's
Governnlent will go back t o the lines which they
~vouldhave done better never to have left. What
pl-esent indications lead me to fear is that, situated
as they are, with very much on their hands, and
di~.idedbetween those who mould go very far and
those who mould cautiously hold back, they are
halting and in danger of a half-and-half ~ o l i c y ,
~vhichto my judgment is the worst of all. My
experience is, that if you have to deal with hornets
only two courses are possible-one, not to stir them
up or aggravate them, the other to smoke them
out and take the nest. To stir them up, put your
hand into the nest and keep it there is not what a
vise man vould do ; yet that is what I am afraid
of, if our present position is maintained.
At any rate, I think it must be apparent that this
questiou which has troubled us so long is not now
t o be met by temporary expedients. W e must
take a. broad view of the whole subject and t r y t o
spttle it on lines that shall be lasting. It is in that
spirit that I desire to approach it. The subject is
one which has interested and occupied me for

r.

upwards of thirty years. It is just thirty years ago
that in the year 1849 I put forth views on the
subject which attracted a good deal of attention at
the time; and I trust that after having matured
those views in the interval from that time to this, I
may not be presumptuous in submitting them for
what they are worth.
The first fallacy against which I think it is
necessary that there should be warning, is that of
supposing that we can find or establish a strong
and friendly government of Afghanistan with whom
we may make terms. My belief is that in truth no
such government is now possible. It is, as it were,
contrary to the nature of things.! To explain
that view I must make a very brief historical
retrospect.

b

THE HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN.

6.~6

Till very modern times no such country as
Afghanistan was known to the world. Nost of
the territory which we now call Afghanistan was
part of the province known to the 'Persians
and Arabs as Khorassan. 'Ihe Afghans were only
known as tribes occupying some of the more hilly
and inaccessible parts of the country, and from
arnong whom successive rulers have drawn mercenary soldiers, many of whoin have colonized in
India. These Afghan tribes were not. found in

tIlr-.Ckllcasia11 range to the north of the country,
liot olllJ- in the mountains further south* Their

origin is a puzzle to ethnographers. They are
eerbkly people quite different from the Persians
nan the orac side and the Indians on the other.
Tllejr hrnpikgre is not a mixture of the languages
of"tlapir I I ~ ~ S ~ I ~ O Ubut
~ S ,a distinct language with
very nr:arked cl~aracteristicsof iks own, though it is
p.rbr1c.rmal9y classed as an Aryan tongue. These are
tlf<;*E,e~pdlk:rrllorn we, using the Persian term
kcnrcely kno~t-n to themselves, call Afghans,
\v%ailt. t%leycan themselves Pathans or Puktans
wtsa% tlltis Eringtlage Pashtoo or Puktoo.
They
have n n a ~ t hthat they are descended from the
tJtqs=;"d,11ut the fact is that the Mahommedan
wpligiorr is SO I P ~ U Cconnected
~
with Jewish origins
rttat a goml many Xahommedan tribes claim a
JcavLh tlexwcent; as do a good many others a
c%c.sce.ra-tfronr Seeunder or Alexander. Their more
diiaimnct traditions ascribe their ori,oinal seat t o the
nar~alnlt:rins of Oflore. but it is not very clear where
t h a t is-ng,l,nrerntly to the north-west of Candahar.
At ;uky n t e . in times before history they had
wcaaj~icds89 the IlilI country east of Caadahar and
( ; P L ~ ~ Z I ~ ~ C ,and thence to the borders of India. I t
-wars not. Ew~x-eyer,
till comparatively modern times
-*?. since the beginning of the sixteenth centQry,
- - % k t t h y adrmrced across tbe Cabul River
c ~ ~ ~ g a i t : b anot
!
0 1 . 1 ~the
~
~ d e of~ Jellalabad
s
and
I'ithrwiir ~ i i l ~same
l
of the sllbmontane countly,
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but also some of the lower Caucasian country
north of the Cabul River. I t is certain that
Peshawur and the Ehyber hills and the valleys to
the north were originally an Indian country. The
peaks of the " Suffeid Hoh 7 7 range still bear Indian
names : and to this day Swat and the other
Afghan valleys north of the Cabul River are only
occupied by the Afghans as the dominant race,
while most of the land is tilled by an inferior race
of Indian blood in the position of serfs, who are
the aborigines of the country and seem to be
allied to the neighbouring races of Cashmere.
The Afghan population has neve-t occupied the
higher parts of the Caucasian range further north,
and the hilly country immediately north and west
of Cabul is still held by other races. Even in the
valley of Cabul and the rest of the more open
country the Afghans seem to be still rather a
dominant tribe than the mass of tillers of the soil.
The accessible parts of the country have generally
not been ruled over by Afghans at all, but by
other and greater powers. We knew that this
mas so from the earliest dawn of history. Great
empires have occupied the country a t large, while
the tribes have maintained a rude independence
in their hills; in frequent collision with the greater
powers by whom they were surrounded, but
!generally bribed and utilized by those powers.
The modern Afghanistan was part of ancient
Persia-then came the Greek dominion, which we

know to have lasted a long time, though its
history is lost ; then the revived Persian empire ;
then the Arab dominion ; and then the invasion
and occupation of the country by Turk and
Mongol conquerors. Mahmoud of Ghuznee, %he
first conqueror of India, no doubt took his title
from a place in Afghanistan, but we know that he
was a Turk who had come there as a conqueror,
and thence conquered India. Subsequently
some dynasties of Afghan origin ruled in India,
but these dynasties were founded by soldiers
of fortune who had risen to power under the
Turks. The Moguls, too, acquired Afghanistan,
or rather, I should say, the country me now call
Afghanistan, first, and India afterwards ; and
while they reigned over India they still held most
of the Afghan country, by means of the resources
which they drew from India. Much trouble they
had in dealing with the Afghans, and it was only
the revenues of their great foreign territories
which enabled them to keep the tribes in check,
partly by bribing them and partly by controlling
them; but sometimes they wholly failed to control
them and suffered great disasters at the hands of
the tribes. They very much utilized the Afghan
soldiers, as the English Government did the
Highlanders of Scotland. It may be said that
under all the Mahommedan rulers of India the
Afghan soldiers very much took the place which is
now occupied by our European soldiers; and thus
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it was that they found their advantage in serving
the emperors. It must also be remembered that
both the employers and the employed professed
the same Mahommedan religion, and altogether the
emperors had much more in common with their
subjects than we can have,-so that they had in
that respect great advantage over us. The
Afghans who settled in India became Indianized
and civilized, and acted as a sort of military
colonists in support of the Mahommedan government.
I n the decadence of the &Iogul government the
Afghan tribes again asserted their independence,
and the great Ghilzye tribe at one time overran
Persia, but the Persians again under Nadir Rhah
conquered and annexed Afghanistan. It was after
the death of Nadir Shah that the Afghan Ahrned
Shah Duranee established a kingdom of his own,
and then we first hear of the country of Afghanistan. Ahmed Shah became a great conqueror,
claimed the title of Shah or King, and as we know
repeatedly invaded India, broke the Mahratta
power in the year 1759, and apparently had India
at his feet. It has always been one of the greatest
puzzles of history why he failed to take advantage
of that position. I believe the truth was that his
do&ion had so little strength or union among
his own Afghans at home, that it was inherently
weak. He was strong to conquer for a time, but he
could not keep his forces together. Under his

12
successors his kingdom soon became very weak.
Although he had left Dehli to the Mogul, and had
abandoned the Empire of India, still the country t o
the west of Delhi-the Punjaub and all the plains
of the Indus, with Cashmere and the hill country
to the north, -mere attached to Afghanistan. But
very coon the Sikhs made themselves independent
in the Eastern Punjaub; and when in the present
century Runjeet Singh rose to power as a great Sikh
ruler, and established a regularly disciplined army, he
soon conquered the Western and Southern Punjaub,
Mooltan and Cashmere ; and eventually crossing
the Indus he conquered the proper Afghan country
of Peshawur, Kohat, and the rest at the foot of the
hills. Sinde fell away from the Afghan kingdom,
Beloochistan became independent, and altogether
it was sadly reduced.
Without the command of money it is impossible
to control the Afghan tribes, and so it was that
when the dominions of the King of Cabul were
thus lopped off, they eipelled their king and he
became a refugee in our territory, till we tried to
reinstate him and brought him to an unhappy
death a t Cabul, in 1842, under circumstances which
are well known. After the expulsion of the Shah,
the family of Dost Mahomed did not claim the
title of King, but were content with the lower title
of Ameer or chief. I n truth there was not one
Ameer, but several Ameers. Cabul was under
one rtder, Candahar under another, Herat under
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another, and Balkh for a time was lost. Dost
Mahomed was a very remarkable man, and he
gradually recovered all these places, but it was not
till the very last days of his life that he took Herat.
Neither he nor ally other Ameer have made the
least pretence of ruling over the great mass of the
Afghan tribes who hold the country adjoining
India from Swat in the north to Quettah in the
south. I mean, not only that they have exercised
no effective rule, but that there has been no
pretence of any feudal sovereignty over the tribes;
on the contrary, unable to restrain or influeace
them, the Ameer has always disclaimed all responsibility for them.
When, after the vicissitudes and changes of
fortune subsequent to Dost Mahomed's death,
Shere Ali at last established himself as the successor of the Dost, he certainly showed some
personal strength and courage, if not other
qualities. With the aid of the money and arms
which he obtained from us, and with our example
before him, he did something towards establishing
what was supposed to be a reformed system and a
regular army, and certainly held his own a great
deal longer than might have been expected; but
the proof of the utter rottenness of the reformed
system is evident in the result of his collision with
us. His power fell to pieces at the very first
touch. He did not fight at all. His government
was, as it proved, hopelessly feeble and rotten.

14
The truth is, that in Afghanistan the only chance
of exercising a considerable authority is when
power falls into the hands of a very strong and
wise man with money at his command. Without
plenty of money, not an angel from heaven could
rule that country.
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THE GEOGRAPHY O F AFGHANISTAN.
Let us try to realize something of the geography
and people of this country which we call Afghanistan. I n doing so we must always remember that
the Afghanistan of the Ameer is not by any means
the country of the Afghan people. On the contrary,
most of the Afghan people are outside the Ameership, while the Ameer has ruled over a good
many countries which are not Afghan in their
population.
The geography is so complicated a congeries of
hills that it is very difficult to describe it. T o the
north is the great Caucasian range. Any one who
looks at the map of Asia sees that the great
backbone, represented to the north of India by the
Himalayas, is continued by the Indian Caucasus or
Hindoo Coosh to the north of Cabul, and thence
through the north of Persia and the Kurd country
into Armenia and the Russian Caucasian province.
To the north-east of Afghanistan the peaks
approach very nearly the highest in the world,
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reaching the altitude of upwards of 28,000 feet;
and on the borders of that country the great peak
of Nanga Parbat, or L L naked mountain"-a prominent object from the Peshawur Valley-is
marked on Colonel Walker's map as 26,629 feet
high. The passes over the higher ranges are never
less than 16,000 or 17,000 feet. We have no
survey of the range to the north of Afghanistan,
but no doubt it somewhat diminishes in height as
it proceeds westward. The easiest pass north-west
of Cabul, leading to Bameean and Turkestan, is
a little over 12,000 ft. high; and the neighbouring mountains are about 20,000 ft. West of
that again we know little of the mountains, but
they seem to be inaccessible till, as the range
approaches Persia, it becomes for a space considerably lower. Connecting with this range, just
after it leaves India, is the mountainous country
of Afghanistan, in which, from north to south, one
range succeeds another in close proximity. The
Sufeid Eoh range south of the Cabul River is
upwards of 15,000 ft. high, while the ranges of the
Suleimanee farther south, so far as we know them,
seem to run to 11,000 and 12,000 Et.
It is the characteristic of many mountain ranges
that they are, as it were, tilted up on one side,
with high elevated plateaus on the other side, often
containing lakes without an exit. That is notably
so in regard to the Himalayas-very precipitous
on the 1ndian side, while Tibet behind is s. rugged

I

and very elevated plateau. Farther west the
steep side of the Caucasus is towards Turkestan
and the Oxus, and that of the Afghan ranges is
tomards India, while much of Afghanistan is
e1evn;ted. Taking the country from the slopes of
the Caucasus to Beloochistan, it may be said that
parallel to the Indus there is a breadth of about
200 miles of mountain country of the steeper and
more difficult character. The whole of this country
is one mass of the steepest and most inaccessible
nlountains, intersected by very deep and low
gorges, and with very scanty valleys scattered
among them. It all drains tomards the Indus,
and the main ranges run east and west. Consequently the few difficult routes through the
country also run east and west, while north and
south there is scarcely any comlnunication, the
physical difficulties being almost insuperable. It
may generally be said that the further we go south
the less insuperable are the difficnlties of this
country. The most practicable passes are towards
the south ;and in Beloochistan the country becomes
a good deal more practicable. I have said that
this tract, draining towards the Indus, is about
200 miles in breadth, from east to west. We then
come to the watershed, and west of the watershed
is a high country which cannot well be called a
plateau, for it is interrupted by ridges and much
accented, bat still in a rough way it may almost
be described, for want of a better term, as sort of
'

her vest the
rds Turkestan
;han ranges is
~fghanistan is
1 the slopes of
y be said that
:adth of about
,he steeper and
of this country
1st inaccessible
leep and low
Ileys scattered
:ds the Indus,
d west. Cons through the
rhile north and
nunication, the
nsuperable. It
aer we go south
iculties of this
;ses are towards
:orintry becomes
have said that
'ndus, is about
vest. We then
' the watershed
ell be called a
iges and much
it may almost
rm, as a sort of

+

f

plateau. The heights of the different places in
this country, as niarked on the map, will generally
be found to be within the range of 5 500 ft. to
7500 ft. in altitude. A considerable portion of
this tract immediately south of Ghuznee drains
into an inland lake without an exit, called the
Abistadeh Lake, situated about 6500 ft. above the
sea. This country is in the direct line between
Ghuznee and Quettah. Being at an elevation so
comparatively uniform, there are no such great
mountains and great depressions as in the country
farther east, and, difficult though it be, there are
some sort of commu~licationsthrough this tract;
so that from Quettah or Pisheen you may go to
Ghuznee without anywhere ascending or descending
on a very great scale; and the main road from
Cabul to Ghuznee and Candahar runs over this
elevated tract. Cabul is at a height of 6400 ft.,
Ghuznee about 7500 ft., and Khelat-i-Ghilzye
again about 5800 ft. West of Ghuznee the country
drains south-west into the Helmuiid and Turnuk
Rivers, and so into the inland sea or Lake of Zurrah,
in Seistan. Towards Candahar and Seistan this
country descends considerably, Candahar being
about 3000 ft. above the sea, whi1.e the Zurrah
Lake is apparently only about 1200 ft. Between
the hills which drain to the south and the main
range of the Caucasus is the valley of the. Harirood,
in the western part of which Herat is situated.
This river runs a long way from east to west, near
2

and pafallel to the main range of the Caucasus,
- much as the CabuZ River on the other side runs
from west to east. Further on the Harirood runs
into the north-east corner of Persia, and thence
loses itself in the deserts of Turkesta~~,
passing
through in fact the only gap in the Caucasian
range-about the point mhere the Turcomans have
been in the habit of entering and harrying Persia.
It must be remembered, however, that a considerable range of hills intervenes between Herat and
the valley of the Helrnund, on the way to Candahar,
while the direct route from Herat to Ghuznee and
Cabul passes over almost impracticable mountains ;
so that there is not really a complete gap in the
mountain barrier. It must also be borne in mind
that there is not, as some people seem to suppose,
a clear road between Herat and Merv. On the
contrary, there is a high portion of the Caucasus
between the Herat Valley and Turkestan.
Col. Abbott, ~ h travelled
o
from Herat to Merv,
prudently declines, for strategical reasons, to give
details of the mountain route; but as he congratulates himself much on safely getting over the pass
"where many have perished in the snow," it is
evident that this crossing is high and difficult.
On the north face of these mountains the Murghab
River has its sources, and that river loses itself in
the desert. of Turkestan, about the place which we
mark in our maps as Merv. In former days, when
all these countries were much more moist and
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fertile than they are now, and the water was
better preserved and utilized, the damming of the
Murghab supplied ancient Merv and probably gave
the means of a considerable cultivation. Now all
these countries have been much desiccated, and the
irrigation works have gone very much to ruin.
There is a, half-ruined Turcoman village somewhere
not far from the site of ancient Merv, to which we
give that famous name.
Streams from the northern face of the Indian
Caucasus also supply the means of irrigation t o
Balkh, Khulm, and the other cultivated tracts
of Afghan Turkestan -that is, the country
between the mountains and the Upper Oxus;
but these streams are all absorbed by irrigation before they reach the Oxus. The banks
of the Oxus itself, in that part of its course, are
for the most part desert and little inhabited. It is
for that reason that the Oxus as the boundary
between Afghanistan and Turkestan (so settled
between ourselves and the Russians) is a very
suitable boundary-far
more suitable than are
most river boundaries.
Badskshan and Wakhan farther east are hilly
countries of the high Oxus, lying on the slopes of
the Caucasus running dovn towards that river.

THE PEOPLES OF AFGHANISTAN.
Strange as it may seem, after all our experience
of Afghanistan, by far the best account of the
2 *
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country and the people as a whole, in fact I rnay
say the only systenlatic account of Afghanistan in
one view, is I - . 1Iountstuart Elphinstone's
" Kingdom of Cabul," the result of his visit to the
Afghan borders in the year 1808. There mas then
still a kingdom of Cabul in the sense which I have
mentioned, that is a potentate with more or less
authority in the valleys and accessible parts of the
country, who claimed a feudal superiority over the
tribes, and who, in addition to all the territories
which we now reckon in Afghanistan, still possessed
part of the western and all the southern portions
of the Punjaub, Moultan, Cashmere, Sinde, and in
some sort Beloochistan ; but he was little able to
hold his own, and his dynasty was tottering to its

Mr. Elphinstone fully describes the extremely
limited character of the kingly authority in
Afghanistan proper, and the . very democratic
system of the Afghan people ; see particularly
chapter 2 of his second book, on the divisions
and government of tlie Afghan nation," and in the
second volume more detailed accounts of the
political system and practices of the Eusofzais,
Duranees, Ghilzyes, and other leading tribes. He
explains that in some of the tribes in more immediate connection with the king, the king had to
some degree the privilege of selecting the principal
chief from among the members of the oldest
family, while in other septs or oolooses the chief
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was elected directly by the people. The heads of
the inferior divisions, the clans and subdivisions of
clans, mere, he tells us, always elected. I n any
case' the government was of the most democratic
character. The government of the ooloos and of
the clan was carried on by assemblies of chiefs
and headmen called Jeerghas - a popular representative body which our frontier officers very well
know ; but it seems after all that the members of
the Jeergha are hardly representatives, but rather
delegates; for according to Elphilistone it is only
in matters of small importance that the Jeergha
can act without consulting their constituents. I n
matters of more importance he says the sentiments
of the whole tribe are ascertained before anything
is decided. He adds that throughout . dl the
tribes the clannish attachment of the Afghans,
unlike that of the Scotch Highlanders, is rather to
the community than to the chiefs, and though in
their notion of their khan the idea of a magistrate
set up for the public good is certainly mixed with
that of a patriarchal and natural superior, yet the
former impression will always be found to be the
strongest."
The Jeerghas are not only political but also
judicial in their functions. Criminal and other
trials are, as Elphinstone fully explains, conducted
by judicial J eerghas.
Elphinstone also explains the distinction, which
he diaws somewhat broadly, between the Eastcrll

and Western Afghans. The Eastern Afghans are
those who inhabit the rugged country draining
towards the Indus, which I have described. Most
of them are agricultural rather than pastoral ; 80
far as the limited soil at their 'disposal permits,
they raise crops and fruit. A great part of their
subsistence is derived from the fruit of the mulberry-tree, dried and pounded. Their means of
subsistence are so scant that they must live much
on their neighbows, either honestly by service or
dishonestly by plunder. They are, even among
Afghans, more especially democratic and independent and very combative, constantly carrying on
little wars amongst themselves. The Western
Afghans, on the other hand, who OCCUPY the
elevated country to the west and the slopes down
towards Seistan, are more pastoral in their habits,
and having given reigning families t o the country,
have become more accustomed to some sort of
kingly rule in the sense of owning fealty to a
feudal king. These RTestern Afghans are mostly
comprehended in the two large septs of the
Ghilzyes who occupy the country near Ghuznee
and Cabul, and the Duranees, formerly called the
Abdallees, who have the country about Candahar
and from thence westmard.
All modern accounts make it clear that the
Afghans are still just the same people as they were
in Elphinstone's time, except that, having got rid
of the semblance of a king of the whole county,
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they are even more independent and uncontrollable
in their ways than they then were. The Eastern
Afghans have, as I have stated, ceased to have any
connection with the ruler of Cabul, and they either
govern themselves or are not governed at all.
Considering the many wines of population and
conquest which have passed over the country, it is
not surprising that there are few parts of
Afghanistan in which the population is not more or
less mixed ; but it may be said that the Afghans
proper, or Pashtoo-speaking people, form the main
population of the country, from the valley of the
Cabul River on the north to abo~xtlatitude 30" in
the south, and from the plains of the Indus on the
east to near Ghuznee, Kelat-i-Ghilzye,and Candahar
on the west. I n fact, a great deal of the central
portion of t.his country has been held by the tribes
in so independent a fashion, that it has never been
explored. We know nothing of the country of
the Wazeerees and some other tribes.
I n the Duranee country, from Candahar westward, the population is more mixed, the dominant
Duranees being a pastoral population, while the
arable lands are a good deal cultivated by other
races, as is indeed the case throughout a great part
of the whole country west of the watershed.
I t is impossible to estimate the numbers of the
Afghans proper. We know nothing of s great
portion of them. They are generally taken to be
from a million and a half to two or three millions,

of whom one portion are British subjects in the
submontane tracts ; another and very large
portion are independent; and another portion have
generally been more or less subject to Cabul,
-rather less than more.
' The Afghans are physically a very fine people.
There is probably no finer race in the world, and
thslt they should be so, in spite of poverty, poor
food, and the absence of washing, is a curious
physiological fact. The climate no doubt is a yery
h e one, tending to robustness.
They have the chstrncter of being avaricious,
mercenary, treacherous, and predatory. Avarice
is the result of poverty combined with energy and
ambition. Situated as they are, and long accustomed to serve as mercenary soldiers, it is not
unnatural they should be mercenwy; and so they
are in an extreme degree. They can generally be
bought over to anything except t,he surrender of
the independence of their own hills; and one
great cause of their weakness as a people is that
every Afghan assumes as it matter of course that
every other Afghan is open to an offer, so that no
man trusts any other man. Treacherous, too,
they are, for they have so- long held the passes
leading from inner Asia t o India, and have been so
accustomed to be bought by the many rival powers
passing that may (who find it cheaper to buy them
than to fight them), that it is scslrcely surprising
that one bargain is a<pt to be superseded by a
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better offer. Predatory they arc by nature
necessity-plunder
they mill alwaj-s get when
they can. On the other hand, they llnve rnl~cEr
pluck, industry, and enterprise. T:nder fa~-o~lrable circumstances they make excellent soldiers;
they make the most of their poor hill-glens, and
carefully tend the orchards vhich supply a great
trade in preserved fruits; and as pushing and
hardy small traders, who find their vay iuto the
farthest part of India, they are unrit-alled.
They are almost all of the Soonnie or orthodox
sect of Mahoi~imedans; but their religion sits verr
lightly on them. They are more governed by
their own customary laws than by the 91ahommedan Code, and seem just as ready to sell tlneir
swords to an unbeliever as to any one else, even
though it is to fight against believers. I t is
generally said that if an Afghan is ernployecl to
cut a throat, he will do so with the lllost entire
absence of religious prejudice. They have, however, their own religious ideas, and seem to be
very fond of holy shrines. The story is either
true or well found which represents the people of
an Afghan village, jealous of their neigl~bouru
who possessed such shrines, as hal-ing caught R
holy man, killed him, and set up his shrine and
worship in their village. T'ie are far too much
given to attribute religious fanaticism to all
Mallolxmedans ; indeed, in all countries such
fhnaticisnl is most frecluently developed wl1~1-1it
'

also serves as a political bond ; and among the
Afghans especially, fanaticism is much more political than religions. Like many other matters,
this is, however, very much a question of race,
and there seems to be a good deal more of real
religious feeling among the Eusofzyes and other
north-eastern Afghans, whose blood has been a
good deal mixed with the aborigines of their
valleys, by descent Indians,-a more imaginative
race. I think that almost all the assassinations on
the frontier that have seemed to partake of a
character of religious fanaticism have been perpetrated by people of these north-eastern tribes.
After the Afghans the most important people
of Afghanistan are the Persian-speaking populations, who are probably almost as numerous in
Afghanistan as a whole as the Afghans themselves, and are certainly much more numerous in
the territories which were ruled over by the
Ameer. I have used the term " Persian-speaking"
because we must not confound these people with
the modern Persians, of whom there are only a
f e a in the towns and some outlying portions of
t'he country. We may, however, fairly apply the
term " Persian," in a large sense, to the great old
Persian race as distinct from the Persians of
modern Persia. These old Persians were a very
great people, and occupied, besides modern Persia,
Bactria and the neighbouring countries; in fact,
not only most of what we now call Afghanistan,
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but almost the whole of Turkestan. They haye
been conquered by Turks and &fo~~gols,
but their
descendants still remain in all these countries,
forming a large part of the cultivating and traclirlg
population, and everywhere retaining dialects of
their own Persian language. The Persian is a
charlning language-charming in its simplicity as
well as in other qualities : it may be called the
English of the East; and none who have once had
the advantage of using it seem ever to abandon it.
Modern Persia is a part of old Persia which, like
the rest, mas conquered and overrun by Turkish
tribes, who still form the dominant race in Persia.
But t h e Persian language prevailed there-the
people of Persia now speak Persian, except in
parts of Western Persia, where the imnligrsllt
tribes retain their Turkish tongue. The nationality
of modern Persia is in a great degree due to the
adoption by these Persians of the Sheeah form of
Mahommedanism, by which they are separated in1
bitter feud from all their neighbours. The Turkish
conquerors, like the Normans in England, have
become amalgamated with the Persians, and so has .
been formed the modern Persian people.
Outside of the limits of this modern Persia
the old Persians retain their self-government irr
some degree only where they have had the protcction of inaccessible hills. I t may be said t b t
they still occupy the whole range of the Caucasus,
from t h e borders of Turlcey to the borders of India.

I cio not know if the Arlnenians are allied to the
Persians, or whether among the variety of race
~bndlanguage which prevail in the Russian Caucasus any peop1es.of Persian origin are to be found;
but the languages of the Kurds show them to be a
Persian mce, and in the hill country in the north
of Persia we ha\-e the most Persian of modern
Persians. Further east, the Eimaks and Haxarehs, tribes occupying a port'ion of the Caucasian
rallge up to the vicinity of Ghuznee and Cabul,
are Persian-spealring, but not pure Persians, as
their features evidently show. They have stroiig
3longolian traits. This is said to be the result of
an immigration of Tartars which took place in the
time of Chengis Khan. They must have amalganiated with the aboriginal Persians, and the
language of the latter prevailed. I have not
learned much of the Eimaks, but t.11ey seem to be
allied to the Hazarehs, and the Hazarehs are well
known, not only because they were frequent at
Caltul during our occupation there, but because
they come down in search of work to the Yunjaub
territories, where they niake capital labourers. A
Hazareh navvy is said to be better than any native
of India. I n the character of labourers, at any
rate, they are a useful and pleasant people.
The Icohistanees, or Highlanders of the hill.
country north of Cabul, are old Persians without
the intermixture of blood ~vhicli makes the
H:~zaiehs a scpasate people ; and again further
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east, Badakshnn and TVakhnll, and it nlsy be said
the whole of the northern face of the Indian
Caucasus till we reach Tibet, are inhabited by
this old Persian race. Affinities of language seem
to show that the interesting race of I<affirs, or unbelievers, of the high ranges-that is, the aboriginal
race never converted to &Iahonzmedanismare also of this ancient Persian stock. All these
hill tribes retain the robustness of the oiiginal
race. I n a tamer condition the salne race forms
the mass of the cultivators of the valley of the
Harirood and the neighbourhood of Herat, and
also of the more southern province of Seistan.
They form a large proportion of the agricultural population of the valleys about Cabul alld
Ghuznee ; in fact, of the whole of Afghanistan
except the portion bordering upon India. They
also occur about Balkh and the other cultivate8
portions of Afghan Turkestan as well as farther
north. They are always quiet and good cultivators.
In Afghanistan and some parts of Turkestan,
they are generally called L L Tajilcs," while in the
further parts of Q~rkestanthe same people are
known as " Sarts " and are frequently described
under that name. They are also known under the
general name of Parseewans or Persians. They
are all Soonnie Mahornrnedans (in that respect
entirely differing from their cogeners the Sheeahs
of Persia) excepting only the Kaffirs, and also I
may add, the Parsees of Western India. This

latter race seems to have emigrated into India
rather than accept M ahommedanism. A little
difference in spelling often prevents us from
recognizing a word, but the words Parsee and
Parsee-wan are really identical with our Persi and
Persi-an. Just so we find it difficult to recognize
the same word in the Turkish Spahi, the French
Cypay8, and the English Sepoy, properly Sipahi.
The people of Indian race found in the northern
and western borders of Afghanistan are now converted to Mahommedanism, but throughout the
coulitry Hindoo bankers and traders, still retaining
their own religion, are everywhere more or less
found.
I n Afghan Turkestan, besides the Persian population which I have already mentioned, there is a
considerable population of Uzbegs, the race of
Turkish conquerors from whom the country came
to be called Tmkestan; but these Uzbegs seem
now to be settled down as a tolerably peaceful
people.
I need hardly mention the Belooches as part of
the population of Afghanista~; as Beloochistan
has for many years been quite independent of
the Afghans ; but some of our maps, include,
I think, in the extreme south a little of the
country bordering on the Lower Punjaub, which is
really held by Belooch tribes. I may say of the
Belooches generally, that it is well known to our
political officers that they are in their character
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materially different from the Afghans, being much
less rabidly independent, if I may so express it,
and more amenable to be dealt with through their
chiefs.

THE DENAKD FOR RESIDENTS.
Such being the country and people of Afghanistan,
let us look to our recent action. As is well known
the present co111plications originally arose out of
our demand to station British Residents in
Afghanistan. We must quite realize what this
means. We must always remember that nearly
connected as Afghanistan is with India, the people
there must necessarily view these things from an
Indian point of view. It is difficult to persuade
them that a Resident does not mean something of
the same character as that to which the term is
applied in India. Now, the British Resident in
India is a very well-known character. He is by
no means merely the minister or ambassador of a
friendly power. He is much more than that. It
is his duty to overlook and criticize the native
state to which he is accredited. This near
supervision and criticism is just what all native
governments exceedingly dislike. They are willing
enough to submit to our military superiority
and political control, but it is the constant overlooking their doinestic affairs that they hate; and

.

all of thein who can by any manner of means
escape from this supervision, spare no effort to do
so. Not only is this the case in regard to the
smaller states who have not hitherto been honoured
wit11 Residents, but 1may instance the case of the
large state of Cashmere. That is a state of our
creation. It is by its original construction
feudatory and tributary to ourselves. I t has
never been at all refractory or troublesome, but on
the contrary has been what I may c d l a very
amenable state. Yet the constant struggle of the
ISIaharajah's life is to escape the infliction of a
permanent Resident, in which object he has
hitherto, I believe, succeeded, though he submits
to a temporary Resident sent up for six months
each year. For my part I think it a mistake too
much to force Residents on native states. I have
always found that if they are t o be maintained at
all, they get on best when they are left alone with
s certain fear before their eyes of that sacred right
of rebellion of which the people are deprived when
we take the matter in hand. In my opinion, by far
the best managed states in India and those most
accepted by the people, are the smaller ones which
have no Residents. I believe the R~rssiansare
much wiser than we in the management of the
states in Asia which they have reduced to a protected condition : they have a very effective
military control oover them, hut do not worry them
with Residents.
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T h e only case of an Indian Resident which
might seem to supply some precedent for
Afghanistan is in Nepaul. We have a Resident in
Nepaul who is not a master but a British Minister
only. We have made in some respects satisfactory
arrangements with the Nepaul government, namely, that while that state retains its
domestic independence, it is bound to take
no Europeans into its service without our permission, to consult us in regard to any disputes
w i t h its neighbours, and especially to submit ta
our arbitration any disputes with one neighbour,
namely, Sikhim. In Nepaul there is a comparatively settled government over a quiet people, and
there are no dangerous neighbours. Yet in truth
in one respect our relations with Nepaul are somew h a t humiliating. The members of our Residency
are strictly confined to the neighbourhood of the
Residency. The Nepnulese prohibit in the strictedt
manner any of our officers or any Europeans
whatever from travelling about, or, as they would
put it, spying in any part of their country, except
only the one direct road from the plains to the
capital. So strictly do they adhere to this rule,
that when I was last in India the officer commanding .the divisiorn in which Da~jeelingis situated,
happening when on a visit to that place to have
gone a little tour in the hills, either from carelessness or accident, overstepped the Nepaul boundary,
a n d being in Nepaul territory was apprehended by
3
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police
~l

and put in gual-d f a *the night.
'rhc nest morning he was taken before. the
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~.cullFin Afghanistan a position so Ilumiliatillg as
b t w]liVhwe thus hold in Nepaul. My opinion is,
*hJ1R e dlould do much better not to demand the
alitni<.iianof 8 permanent Resident at Cab111 or
do not proceed to a military occuhrrabAar,if
14abtnof.tllose places. ' It mould be quite enough
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n q mire with the Russians.
The population
nl.x,llt l%:hlkhis not Afghan, and there are not the
ralrrr: ttifiictilties and objections to a resident Agent
rho: ttrrsrc are among an Afghan population, where,
t rrrt i f the Afg2ian government consents, the
~wiqole are apt to make the position a very
tlaflgtbwtr s one.
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territory, and that is really much more convenient
for dealing with the Turcoman frontier, to which
t h e r e is much easier access from Persia than from
H e r a t . Not only is Meshed much nearer to Merv
t h a n is Herat, but the Persians hold Surakhs and
o t h e r places on the immediate border of Turkestan.
I feel however that in truth this question of the
Turcoman border requires to be carefully dealt
with. Merv, as I have explained, is now a mere
-me;
b u t the village in the vicinity which we are
$eased t o call Merv is really a specimen of a class
of places which involve important questions with
r e g a r d t o the position of the Turcomans. The
Russians have it appears brought under control all
t h e settled Uzbeg Khanates. There remain only
the wandering Turcoman tribes of the desert lying
between Khiva and the hilly boundaries of Persia
and Afghanistan, who though punished have not
b e e n brought under subjection, and who, predatory
as they are, give a great deal of trouble. We may
gather, however, that these people are not altog e t h e r incorrigible when they have the means of
settling down to an honest livelihood, Considerable
numbers of them seem to have settled to cultivat i o n within the Persian borders, and they have
considerable cultivated tracts of tlieir o w . They
h a v e it appears a line of agricultural settlements
stretching along the northern face of the hills from .
Kezil Arvat, the present limit of the 1Zussin11
military po~ver, ensh~vfird to Mcrv. All rtlolig
3 "

a

that line of country streams coming down from
the hills give the means of irrigation and cultivation which these Turcomans have utilized, and so
formed a number of small settlements. The Merv
district upon the larger stream, the hlurghab, is a
somewhat larger settlement of the kind. The last
Englishman whb visited Nerv, Colonel James
Abbot, describes it as a village of about one
hundred huts, some twelve miles from the site of
Old Merv. There is, he says, considerable irrigation and cultivation, but only the poorer grains are
produced, and from his account it appears that far
from its being a granary of Asia, as some people
have supposed, grain is really brought across the
desert from K h i ~ ato Merv and thence into the
barren hills lying between Merv and Herat. The
Turcomans of the desert have their places of refuge
and recruitment in the various oases which I have
described along the foot of the hills-thither it is
that the Russians may find it necessary to chase
them. They have chased them, and are apparently
about to chase them again into the smaller oases
to the west, and some day they may have ground
for chasing them into Merv. That is really the
whole question of Merv, about which so much has
been said. No doubt me cannot expect that the
Russians should submit to allow these people to
retain asylruns from which they themselves are
debarred. While the Turcornans still issue for
~urposesof plunder it seems quite necessary that
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some settlement should be made, and that betmeen
t h e Russians, the Persians, the Afghans, and ourselves an arrangement for, if I may so express it,
policing the Turcomans, and if possible settling
them down, should be come to.
I n another quarter, north of the Caucasus, there
is also the prospect of diEculty. 'The last news is
that the Badukshanees have wholly revolted from
the suzerainty of the Afghans; which is just what
might have been expected, for the Afghan dominion
over them is very recent, and never mas very
complete. Over Wakhan, I believe, the Afghan
dominion mas purely nominal. In the arrangement
that mas made with Russia by which Badukshan
and Wakhan were reserved to Afghanistan, we
counted without the Badukshanees and TVakhanees*
If we should try to force them back to Afghan
rule it may be that we shall drive them into the
arms of Russia. As thhgs now stand, if they
have really thrown off the Afghans, it may be
necessary that we should establish direct communications with them through British Agents. If we
acknowledge their independence, this may not
b e difficult, for these Persian races are much lnore
if
tractable than Afghans.
As regards the question of a permanent Resident
at Cabul, we must always bear in mind that the
Ameer, even with the best intentions, really would
have very great difficulty in securing the safety of
t h e mission, while the internal discords among the

themselves must render the position of
&&dent most difficult. In case of commotion
:ara<f rerolution he mould find it very difficult
ilidcerl ro regulate his conduct without giving
~rle,rtnIoEence to one party or other. Suppose the
rnsintions of fortune which occurred after the
cjentfl of Dost Mahommed to follow the death of
-4li also (and in truth me should expect theIlll
I * ) be much more aggravated) how impossible it
w5.u2tlbe for a British Resident a t the capital to
1.1 bin1 ,a &fife and impartial position without the
~ i g g '0a.t
~ !
of a military force. Let us not put our&& 1%c* in 30 unpleasant a position.
$]fidrcj

THE SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER.
Srst Ire come to the scientific frontier, which
wt* fire toIiI is not the cause but the consequence of
t l i ~war.

I must examine that question a little in

rIvr:ri%.

I

out m y views of a safe and scientific
frt-jxltier in 1849, when we annexed the Punjaub.
IVfisr 1 ihen considered to be the scientific frontier
rn. the upper course of the Indus. General
Ilroilcy, an authority very much to be respected,
-:lgficats sereral objections to the Indus as a
fra.:iticr7 but I find that his statement of the case
"ftm
entirely to the lower course of the river,
wilere it flows through broad plaius separated by a
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loni
Ind
on 1
is nr
the
COUS

Salt

A fg
I<ur
with
Afgl
conq
are
their
they
of tl
The
true
side
Run:
a shc
brou,
ment
the r

Itali~
dint
was t
.Afgh
front:

st render the position of
[It. In case of commotion
11d find it very difficult
conduct without g i v i n g
ty or other. Suppose the
%ich occurred after the
3 t o follow t h e death of
~ t we
h should expect t h e m
\rated) how impossible it
'esident at t h e capital t o
a1 position without the
e. L e t u s n o t p u t our)osition.

.C FRONTIER.
scientific frontier, w h i c h
> but the consequence of
that question a little in
F a safe and scientific

annexed the P u n j a u b .
be the s c i e n t s c frontier
the Indus.
General
much to be respected,
'S to the I n d u s as a
~tatementof t h e case
Course of t h e river,
3 plains separated by a

'

long distance from the mountaivins, and where the
Indian populations overpass it and are found equally
on both sides. I quite admit that the Lower Indus
is not a suitable frontier-but my Indus frontier is
the Upper Indus, where it divides the lower hill
country of the Punjaub and the range known as the
Salt range from the mountains and valleys of
Afghanistan. In the latitude of Peshawur and
Icurram the Indus runs through this hilly country
with Little or no cultivation on its banks. The
Afghan districts beyond the Indus which were
conquered by Runjeet Singh, and to which me
succeeded, namely, Peshamur, Kohat, and Bunnoo,
are valleys surronnded by the Afghan hills, and
their cultivation depends on the irrigation which
they draw &om the hill streams. The population
of these districts is really almost wholly Afghan.
The Ind~xs,in fact, in this part of its course is n
true ethnological boundary, the population on one
side being Indian, and on the other side Afghan.
Runjeet Singh had in fact held these districts but
a, short time, and the Sikhs had never thoroughly
brought them under control. The civil government was carried on through Afghan Sirdars, and
the military government was in the hands of the
Italian General Avitabile, who held his own by
dint of copious hanging. My proposal in 1849
was to give back these extra-Indian districts to the
Afghans, establishing our own scientific military
frontier upon the Upper Indus. The Indus is

there a rapid and difficult stream, forming ~m
admirable military boundary. Confined within
high banks, it is not so broad or devious as to
prevent our bridging it by the aid of modern
science. We might have had bridges commanded
by our forts. I went, however, a little farther, and
proposed a plan by which the Afghan districts
which had been conquered by Runjeet were to be
given back, not unconditionally, but as fiefs of the
British crown, for which homage was to be done,
and in consideration of which the Afghans were t o
be bound to our alliance, and were to be debarred
from political relations with foreign powers. My idea
was that b y a gift on these terms, besides getting
rid of an expensive encumbrance, me should not
only have given an zlccession t o the means of the
ruler of Cabul which might the better enable him
to maintain some sort of regular government in
Afghanistan, and bind him to us by the obligation of this gift, but also we should have something upon which we could come d o ~ nin case
of any misconduct without the disagreeable necessity of a campaign in the Afghan hills. I also
suggested that we should reserve the privilege of
marching through these Afghan fiefs in order to
block the passes whenever such a step might be
considered necessary; and I threw out for consideration that possibly we might establish an
easily-garrisoned hill fort at the mouth of the
l i l ~ y h-a
r
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described it-where would be kept the key of the
gate, and admittance given or refused as we should
desire. I must admit, too, that at this time I
proposed as part of the arrangement that the
Ameer should receive a Resident British Minister
at Cabul., It is possible that if things had been so
arranged at that time, and a very substantial
benefit conferred in return for what we asked.
thillf;~might have settled down on that basis, and
the arrangements might now have become permanent and satisfactory to both parties. ~~t
perhaps I should say that I am wiser now, and see
the difficulties and disadvantages of the British
Nesident more clearly than I did then.
Lord Dalhousie,-that great man, who mas then
told me that he
Governor - General,-himself
approved in principIe of my suggestions, and would
llave preferred the Indus boundary to that which
was adopted, if other considerations had not interfered; but he said that the Afghans had come
down and given some assistance to the Sikhs
during the war, and that this precluded him from
luaking such a. concession as I suggested. I have
d\v;~yshad the greateat respect for and admiration
of Lord Dalhousie, and I have been bis follower in
things ; but I must say I think that in
illis matter he too much sacrificed permanent to
I'ss&ng considerations. After thinking over the
~ l l i t e rfor thirty years more, I am, I confess, of
tllo aalnc opinion still, and believe that the Indus

would have been the best boundary. I not only
admired Lord Dalhousie's great genius, but thought
him entirely right in the annexations which he
made within India, the Punjaub, the Nagpore
country, and the rest-(oude
be it remembered
he did not annex : he declined that because he
thought we could not justly do it). If, however,
that great man had a weakness, it was perhaps in a
disposition to carry annexation too far, and I
ventured to think him wrong when he overstepped
the natural and ethnographical boundaries of India
in going beyond the Indus on one side and into
Burmah on the other. It is somewhat curious that
now, thirty pears later, both those extra-Indian
annexations have brought us into trouble. I t may
be that if we had never crossed the Indus in 1849
we should not now be involved in a new Afghan
war; and whatever the immediate advantages of
the Burmese annexation, if me had not gone
beyond India to the Irawady, we should not now
be troubled with the question which looms before
us in Burmah.
However, as a matter of fact, in 1849 we carried
our frontier up to the foot of the Afghan hills, and
for the last thirty years we have encountered there
the difficulties which I and other3 anticipated.
With our strong and equal hand we have no doubt
managed directly to administer the annexed
districts as Runjeet Singh never did, but we have
have had great trouble with them. For instance,
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show more murders than the rest of India, and
the one district of Peshawur more murders than
all the rest of the Punjaub. The difficulty of
bringing the perpetrators to justice is extreme, for
I am told that in point of audacious, unblushing,
and well-supported perjury a Bengalee is a mere
child to an Afghan. These difficulties, however,
are trifling coinpared to those caused by the raids
of the hill tribes upon our borders. These raids
always have been from the beginning of time, and
I am afraid always will be. We have had the
most extreme difficulty in devising sufficient means
of dealing with the tribes upon our borders. We.
have tried blocking them out from all traffic with
OUT territory, but that has been only partially
successful, and every now and again we are
obliged to undertake expeditions into the outer
hills. From the time of Sir Charles Napier and
Sir Colin Campbell down to the present, these
expeditions have always been of the same character, with the same results, or rather no results.
W e always, with much fuss, arrange expeditions,
each of which is is to be the really effective and
exemplary one, which is to settle the question
finally. We always go up into the bills and
generally ellcounter but little resistance in going.
When we get into the petty settlements within our
reach the hill people disappear with their flocks
and hcrcls and goods, and leave 116 their miserable
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huts, upon which we wreak our vengeance, as we
do upon any petty crops they may have left, if it
is the crop season. -When that is done, nothing
remains but to go back again. As soon as we
turn, the hill tribes are down upon our rear; and
thus having marched up the hill, we march down
again in a somewhat humiliating way, howled at and
fired upon by the Afghans as we go; so with more
or less loss we get home again and write a
despatch, describing the whole affair as a most
successful expedition, crowned by a glorious
x~ictory. That has been many times repeated. I t
must be admitted that this state of things is not
very satisfactory, and in spite of our so-called
~~ictories
the evil has not been cured. But upon
the whole the raids and the expeditions are of late
years somewhat less numerous than they were
before. Some of the hill people we have induced
to settle in the lover districts, upon land we have
given them. And a t any rate we know the worst
-me have become accustomed t o the situation.
There is R, limit to the exposed border; and after
all it may be said, that these troublesome tribes are
rather thoims in our side than a serious political
danger. One thing is quite certain, 'that for
offensive action against us, the Afghan tribes are
wholly contemptible. NO two tribes ever seem to
be capable of uniting against us for offence, and if
ever they did unite, they would still be entirely
contemptible enemies down in the plains. There
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a single division would very easily dispose of
thew.
That was the position till the other day. Now
let us see the new position that has been taken up.
On t h e first day of the present session of Parliament, Lord Beaconsfield in the Lords and Sir
Stafford Northcote i n the Commons made a s b u l tane0u.s and almost identical announcement, to the
effect that the objects of the present war had been
already accomplished by the occupation of the
points which our troops had reached, and Lord
Beaconsfield went on to say that this accomplishment of the object of the war consisted in the
occupation of the three main routes between India
and Afghanistan, which he said he hoped we
should permanently retain. I n saying this he
referred t o the occupation of what are known as
the Khyber, Kurram, and Bolan routes. Now as a
matter of fact, the Iiurram is certainly not one of
the three main routes between India and Afghanistan, for the plain reason that by this route Cabul
and the upper country are only reached over a
succession of difficult passes, the highest of which
is 12,000 feet high,-say twice the height of the
Simplon. It is quite clear that such a mountain
pass is not one which can ever admit of an easy
and abundant traffic, or of the passage of troops
encumbered with baggage and wheeled carriages.
This route has never been and cannot be used to
any considerable extent for mercantile pLlrposes

It is in no sense one of the main routes. There
really three main routes, but the principal
route lying intermediate between the Khyber and
the Bolan is not the Eurram, but a route much
further south known as the Gomul or Goleree. We
have very little knowledge of this route, and have
never surveyed it, but it must be a c o l ~ p a r a t i v ~ l ~
easy way to the high tract between Ghuznee and
*
Quettah, for it seems that it is really more used by
traders than any other route ; t h e private traffic
that may is I gather larger than by either the
Khyber or the Bolan.
I leave the question of the Bolan for the present.
IZcre I desire to examine the effect of our
atcupation of the Khyber and Rurrarn routesespecially of the Kurram.
The result of that
a~rangemcntis that we have projected our occupation along narrow valleys far i n t o the hills, and
have taken possession in each case of long strips of
cowltry which may be described as a11 length and
no breadth. The result evidently is and must be
a greet multiplication of our old difficulties; for
rvllcrens we have hitherto had comparatively short
liues of frontier along the foot of the hills, we
ha>-enow, by running veiy far up into the hills at
several points, made that frontier several times
longer than it was before. The result has been,
a11dmust continue to be, that we have had many
more edlisions with many more tribes than ever
we hacl before; for me come into contact with a
-
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great many tribes whom we had not before touched.
The accounta which we almost daily receive sufficiently evidence that this is the state of things.
Every two or three days the telegraph brings us
an account of a fight with this tribe or with that.
The general result seems to be that 200 or 300
of the natives are killed to two or three on our
side. Sometimes our loss is more considerable.
Correspondents have been brought under military
control, and me are not permitted to know the
truth of these things; but from such accounts as
we have I am rather inclined to fear that some of
the actions in which the losses on the two sides are
so utterly disproportionate, are little more than
attacks by our troops on villagers who have not at
once made submission. Other affairs have been
more serious. For instance, I believe there is no
doubt that the expeditions we undertook against
the AEreedees of the Khyber, whom we attempted
t o punish in the Bazaar and Teerah hill valleys,
really were a failure, ending in our retreat for
strategical and political reasons. It is well understood, too, that a good deal of such success as me
have had with the tribes has been achieved as
much by bribing as by fighting. The many small
fights which are grandiloquently described in the
telegrams may be exhilarating to our troops, but
they are by no means so to the Afghans. On the
contrary, they must inevitably lead to a, very great
bitterness and deep hatred.
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notable instance of the irnpolic~of
this petty style of warfare is General Roberts's
expedition into the Khost Valley:
In former
days, in connection with operations on the other
extremity of India, I have had the pleasure of
bowing and appreciating General Roberts's
qualities. He was then. in a subordinate
psition, and no one man could have been better ;
but I must say it now seems that, having risen
somewhat suddenly to high military and political
command, he appears to have been left too unbridled, and not only to h a ~ ecarried his military
action improvidently far, but to have dabbled too
much in politics to which he was not bred. The
Valley of IChost is far away in the hills, altogether
apart from our former frontier, and also quite off
the line of the ICurram route to Cabul. *''The
inhabitants of that valley had given us no cause
of offence whateve; when General Roberts -undertook their subjugation. The descriptions of the
correspondent of the StancZa~d probably were
highly coloured, but in the main I cannot see that
they have been at all contradicted. General
Roberts's telegrams did in fact confirm the main
portion of the correspondent's statements. There
seems no doubt whatever that General Roberts
did carry fire and sword into that comparatively
peaceful and happy valley-if such a term can be
applied to any Afghan alley ; that ehe did burn,
destroy, and plunder a number of villages and
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killed many of the inhabitants. I had assumed
that the justification of these proceedings mould
have been that the Afghans had committed atrocities according to the military code which we
choose to set up; that is to say,that not being able
to meet us in open stand-up fight according to the
fashion which suits us best, they had carried on a
guerilla warfare, and cut off our stragglers, &c.,
according to the fashion which suits them best, but
which me do not recognize. Somewhat to my
sulprise, I find from General Roberts's dispatch that
this is not so. I n that despatch he does not allege
a n y atrocities on the part of the Afghans as a reason
for the severe punishment which he had avowed
that he meted out to them; their original offence
was that '' it was 'very evident that the arrival
of the British forces was not a welcome event to
the inhabitants of the country." On the contrary,
they collected in the villages and allowed the
neighbowing hill tribes to collect there in a way
that was deemed to imply an inclination t o resist
the forcible annexation of the country. . I t mas
upon that ground that the British troops attaclced
them, and treated them with such extraorclinasy
severity. I must say I cannot see what justification we can have for carrying on war in a manner
so contrary to civilized usages in a district where
we were acting simply with the desire to annex
new territory. After all, it turned o ~ tliat
t
General Roberts in going iiit,o Khost had attempted
4

was beyond his means, and he was obliged to
retreat in a somewhat ignominious wagr. ' The
result certainly must be to leave memories of
bitter. hatred among the people of Khost without
our having accomplished any object whatever!
Not only did we thus come into collision with
tribes in the very heart of Afghanistan with whom
we had no previous quarrel, but the result was to
stir up all the hornets about, and as an immediate
consequence of this expedition the great tribe of the
Waziris made a serious and successful raid into
our own territories 011 the other side of the hills.
The whole Kurram movement was, I thitllc, a
mistake. We have scattered our forces imprudently. We should have done much better to
concentrate them on the Khyber and the Bolan,
both of which are far more practicable routes.
Of the Iihyber this at least may be said, that it is
the only route practicable for g ~ ~ i and
l s carriages,
and that it is that which has always been followed.
It does not involve the surmounting of passes at a
great elevation, but only the ascent to Cabul
through passes difficult but not impracticable. Of
the Bolan I shall speak presently. Here I will
only add, that about Candahar also it has seemed
to be a strange policy to allow of advances to
Gharisk and other places, involving disagreeable
collisions with the people followed by retreat. That
can only irritate and embolden the tribes. We
should have been in a better position if we had

halted
t o adv:
with s
supers
Tak:
the occ
it is nt
by ar;
t

\

appeal
other

think,
object
three
Besidt
side c
route,
the p
tion
lines.
Kurr :
of WE
absoll
'

It a1

I.

prett;
the f
absoll
Kurrt
upper
12,oo
year,

bliged to
1j7.

' The

nories of
h without
,ver.J
ion with
th whom
lt was to
nmediat e
!be of the
raid i n t o
~ehills.
think, a
ces i m better to
e Bolan,
? routes.
that it is
arriages,
bllowed
,sses at a
Cabul
ble. Of
be I w i l l
; seemed
mces to
greeable
,t. That

-

We
we h a d

3s.

halted quietly at Caiidahar, unless we had resolved
to advance to Cabul. I suspect the Afghans may
with some truth suppose that we have a sort of
superstitious dread of Cabul.
Taking a purely military view of the occupation of
the occupation of the three routes through the hills,
it is not for me to attempt to determine the matter
by arguments of my own. On this subject I
appeal to the authGity of General Hamley and
other sciebtific military authorities, who have, I
think, very clearly shown the extreme strategical
objections to the plan of occupying separately all
three routes, if we are not to do more than. that.
Besldes the constant exposure to attacks on either
side of a very long line of occupation on each
route, what they specially dwell upon as fatal to
the plan is the entire want of lateral communication between the forces occupying the different
lines. The Bhyber route is separated from the
Kurram route by the Sufeid ICoh range, the height
of which is so great and so uniform that there are
absolutely no passes through or over it whatever.
I t appears to maintain throughout its length a
pretty uniform altitude of about 15,000 ft., SO that
the force stationed along the Khyber route is
absolutely cut off from that on the Kurram. The
Kurram route communicates with Cabul, and the
upper country only over the Shutergurden pass,
12,000 ft. high, blocked by snow great part of the
year, and at its best only practicable for very light
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traffic. I t is literally the fact. t h a t General
Roberts's force cannot communicate with that of
Sir Samuel Brown's by any other means than either
by going back t h o u g h Kohat and Peshawur and up
the Xhyber again,, or else over the Shutergurden
and back to the Khyber through Cabul. On the
other side me cannot tell the height of the mountains and the character of the passes between the
Kurram and the Gornul or Goleree route, simply
because that is an inaccessible country, to this day
wholly unexplored, and regarding which we are
almost entirely without information. It m a y
certainly be assumed that it does not admit of easy
military communications. That being so, it is
scarcely surprising that no responsible military
men have been found to advocate this plan of
occupying the three routes, so far as I have been
able to learn. The only man of authority who did,
I believe, some years ago when he was a younger
man and had not his present experience advocate
the occupation of the Rurram Valley, was G e n e r a l
Peter Lumsden, the present Adjutant-General in
India ; but I atn told that in his late letters he
expresses an opinion decidedly adverse t o the
positions which we have take up. Lord Napier of
Mngdala's opinion seems to be decided on the
point. He was long in favour of holding on to our
Indian frontier. Now his -opinion has advanced,
and he argues that me must place our frontier
be~ondthe tfibes whose hostility gives so much
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trouble, and says, LL it is for the interest of the
empire that when the day for the struggle comes
we should fight our battles beyond the mountain
barrier. I think it necessary for the interests of
our Indian Empire that we should advance beyond
the mountain barrier and fight the battle of India
outside and not inside of it." This view, then, is
that if we advance at all we must take up positions,
not merely within the mountain passes but beyond
them.
I n addition to the strategical disadvantages of the
plan for holding these different routes through the
mountains, another great objection is the unhealthiness of the hot and barrow valleys. Peshawur has
always been a. most unhealthy place, which has
created great havoc among our troops, and already
me have begun to experience the same difficulty in
the more advanced posts. This, too, seems t o be a
strong reason why we should either not advance a t
all, or advance further into the higher and healthier
country.
Certainly this plan for occupying the three routes
is not dictated by military science.
1
Well, then, if this new frontier which we have
now occupied is not scientific from a military point
of view, is it a scientific frontier from a political
point of view ? ' On this subject I am able to quote
a very high authority, no less than the real author
of the plan of the scientific frontier. Dr. Bellew .
has accompanied several rnissioils into ~ f ~ h a n i s t a n ,
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hag probably soen more of these hills than any
other man, and so far as his knowledge goes there

certainly could be no better authority. It is
generally understood, I may say known, that he is
the only msu whom Lord Lytton has very fully
admitted into his confidence in this matter. It
seems that some years ago ih.,Bellew had published his opinions on the subject of the frontier,
and now, after the advantage he has had of full
communication with Lord T,ytton, and with a complete knowledge of what is going on, he has
republished his views in the form of a little
pamphlet which has been sent to me from India.
that pamphlet I have found to my surprise that the idea of 'L
rectifying" the frontier in
order to obtain " a scientific frontier" which we had
attributed to Lord Beaconsfield, is really plagiarized
from Dr. Bellew, whose letters, published y e w ago,
are entirely devoted to urging this plan-the terms
" scientific frontiep'and '' rectification" being those
which he continually repeats. Let us see, then,
what Dr. Bellew's plans are. First, I may quote
him as showing with much greater authority than
I can the objections to a mere occupation of the
routes through the hills according to the present
plan. He says :'' The Iiurrarn Valley would involve the addition
of about 150 miles of hill frontage to our border,
and would bring us into contact with the indey e~identOrakzais, Zaimukhts, Toris, Cabul-Iihel,
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Waziris and others, against whose hostility and
inroads, here as in other parts of the border, we
shall have to protect our territory. By its possession, as we are now situated, we should be committed to the defence of a long narrow strip of
land, a perfect cul de sac in the hills, hemmed in
by a number of turbulent robber tribes, who are
under no control and acknowledge no authority.
I n ordinary times its acquisition would add to the
serious difficulties of our position. I n times of
trouble or disturbance on the border its possession
would prove a positive source of weakness, a dead
weight upon our free action. I n it we should run
the risk of being hemmed in by our foes in the
overhanging hills around, of being cut off from our
communicrttions with the garrison at Kohat, by the
Orakzais on the one side, by the Waziris on the
other. These fire the disadvantages of the step.
In return what advantages should we derive 3
Not one. With Kurram in our possession, me
certainly could not flank either the Khyber or the
Goleri
because between it and the one intervenes the impassable snowy range of Sufed I<oh,
and between it and the other intervenes the vast
routeless hilly tract of the TVaziris. From Kurram
we could neither command Cabul nor Ghazni,
because the route to either is by a several days'
march, over stupendous hills and tortuous defiles,
ill comparison with which the historical Iihyber
and Bolan passes, or even the less widely known

Goleri pass aie 8s I<i~~g's
highways; These are the
main objections to the adoption of the scheme with
our border as it now stands. But let the border
be rectified, let the frontier line be reconstructed,
and all these objections and disadvantngea rlisappear."
Well, he says that everything is to be put right
by rectifying the frontier, and he proceeds to tell
us what that means. He says :- .
" But mhat does the rectification of the border
mean? What does the reconstruction of the
frontier imply ? By reconstruction of the frontier
is implied the subjection of the border tribes, and
the embodiment of schemes for their employment.
We must now no longer pursue the course me
Save hitherto followed. We mnst norp change
our policy entirdy ; we must now alter our tactics
altogether. Instead of, as heretofore, settling our
border quarrels by expeditions against tlhc offend.
ing tribes, me rn.ust now, and for the future, take
advantage of them to settle our border line. We
must, in future, wage Tar with each offending
tribe. 'CVe must annex their hills, disarm the
people, and reduce the clans to subjection. We
must tell them that they are bad neighbonrs, not
fit to be free; that we have tried them for twenty
years, and found them habitually abu sing their
independence; that they are no linger tolerab!e as
neigl~bours; and that me now come to take their
country under our rule, 2nd to redu-ce them to
,

suJ,jection.

on

their subjection.
risoll
located
the
asarmed, a proportion employe
&c., &c., form elements in
the counti*y, and t h e reconstruct^
shall convert e set of lamlest
prosperous subjects and veluab
shall supply all our frontier de
rid. of all oul*frontier troubles." '
This, at least, is intelligible c
lew's plan is not merely t o holl
n.hollg' t o conquer and o c c ~ ~ ptl y
hill tribes and thoroughly t o I
31y only o l ~ection
j
to t h e plan i;
in the least attempt to show b
done. * ' He says "Do it," and s
dently what he proposes is muc
done. It would no doubt be F
could be done, b u t we should
very hard nuts t o crack before
he proposes. I have heard Afgl
t o our Scotch Highlands. I h
You p u t down those tro~1ble
d turned their hills into de
and shooting grounds-why
sh
down the Afghan tribes in the s:
the obj ejections are that Afghani
larger than the Highlands of
inountains are many times
are fal* less amenable to suth,

lese are the

the border
mstructed;
~ t a g e s dis:put right
:eds to tell

subjection. On >their subjection, a, suitable garrison permanently located in the hills, the people
disarmed, a proportion employed as militia and
police, &c., &c., form elements in the settlement of
the country, and the reconstruction of the frontier.
We shall convert a set of lawless hill robbers into
prosperous subjects and valuable soldiers. We
shall supply all our frontier deficiencies and get
rid of all our frontier troubles." .
This, a t least, is intelligible enough. Dr. Bellem's plan is not merely to hold the passes, but
wholly to conquer and occupy the country of the
hill tribes and thoroughly to keep them down.
"My only objection to the plan is that he does not
in the least attempt to show how this is to be
done. ' ~ esays '' Do it," and stops there. Evidently what he proposes is much easier said than
done. It would no doubt be very desirable if it
could be done, but we should have a good many
very hard nuts to crack before we could do what
he proposes. I have heard Afghanistan compared
to our Scotch Highlands. I have heard it said,
L L You put down those troublesome Highlanders
and turned their hills into delightful recreation
and shooting grounds-why should not you put
down the Afghan tribes in the same way?" Well,
the objections are that Afghanistan is many times
larger than the Highlands of Scotland, that the
mountains are many times higher, that the people
are far less amenable to authority, that we are
4u'
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many times more distant from our resources, that
the resources and revenues of India are not in the
same proportion as the resources and revenues of
England, and that you can hardly carry the
.Afghans across the .seas to colonize a new country
as you clid with the Highlanders, when you substituted sheep for men, and grouse for sheep, and
deer for grouse. I confess I am not bold enough
to recommend any such attempt in Afghanistan.
d
On the contrary, I am not for attacking the
independent hill tribes at all. I t seems to me that
in the House of Commons the strong common-sense:
of Mr. Burt, the Member for Morpeth, brought
him very much to the point when he said, that
proressing as me did to enter into.the war only to
coerce the Arneer of Cabul, me really have
expended most of our energies in fighting the
independent peoples of Afghanistan. There can
.be no doubt of this, that if we attempt a conquest
of the tribes in order to obtain a scientific frontier,
we must 'enter on a war which can hardly be said
to have yet begun. As I have already remarked,
our present positions have been mon as much by
bribery as by fighting, So long as me do not do
more than we have yet done, the tribes which have
not specially suffered do not seem to take our proceedings very much to heart ; in fact, they have
something of the same feeling towards us which
hunters may be supposed to have in regard t o an
invasion of rich fur-bearing animals-they may do

'

some damage at first, but i
leave their skins behind
facetious Special -Correspon,
telegraphed that there as a
uDon the rumour t h a t we +
That, no doubt, was a plea
tainly the case that if We
master the interior hills, the
.,tirely different character f
has yet had, and the indcr
ceI*tairJy fight vexy much k
yet fought.
I assume, then, that the c
not be a t t e m p t e d ; n
thorough measure t h e occupa
as General Roberts has ta
such difficulties as Dr. B(
painted, we must 1001; elsev
frontier.
I am much co
advance at all we callnot agai
frontier till w e r e d the h
have described, lying fui$h,
doubt, it might be possible
frontier, beypnd and comm
valleys of the eastern trib(
countl*ywhich ~ v o u l dadinit (
tions between one part find
S o long as we occupy ju
without isolating
s t almost ncccssarily
t:
L

Ices,

tllst

ot in t.he
?enues of
irry the
~0~1ltl-y

u substie
and
L enough
.istan.

on-sense
brought
.id, tlint
only to
ly hare
ing tll e
ere can
:oncluest
frontier,
be said
marked,
I U C by
~
I not do
ch have
)ur proey have
; which

some damage at first, but it is hoped that they
will leave their skins behind them in the end. A
facetious Special Correspondent, the other day,
telegraphed that there was a panic in Afghanistan
upon the rumour that we were about to retreat.
That, no doubt, was a pleasantry; but it is certainly the case that if we were t o attempt t o
master the interior hills, the war would assume an
entirely different character from anything that it
has yet had, and the independent tribes would
certainly fight very much better than they have
yet fought.
I assume, then, that the conquest of the tribes
mill not be attempted; and i f without that
thorough measure the .occupation of such positions
as General Roberts has taken is attended with
such difficulties as Dr. Bellew has so vividly
painted, we must look elsewhere for the scientific
frontier.
I am much convinced that if we
advance at all we cannot again arrive at a scientific
frontier till we reach the high country which I
have described, lying further west. There, no
doubt, it might be possible to establish a new
frontier, beyond and commanding the hill8 and
valleys of the eastern tribes, and situated in s
country which mould admit of lateral communications between one part and another.
So long as we occupy just enough to irritate
without isolatiiig and controlling the tribes, it
must almost necessarily be that 'besides continually
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ha~*assingus, they will intrigue with Cabul,
Cabul will intrigue with Russia, and our latter
state will be worse than our first. We shall thus
be in continual hot water till we are obliged
self-defence, and under pressure of circumstances,
to make a farther advance. I shall say something
more of the advanced frontier when I come to the
'' last resort."

POSSIBLE ARRA NGIEMENTS.
Now comes the question, "It is very easy to
object to everything, but what mould you do ?"
I am very clear as to what I mould have clone a
little time ago, and that is-nothiy.
Now that we
are involved in the present complications, it is much
more difficult to say what should be done, but I
will try the best I can.
I have hitherto said nothing of the Bolan pass,
and Iwill now go to that part of the question. In
fact, the Bolan is situated very differently from the
other routes. The Sulimanee mountains, the
habitat of the Eastern Afghans, and t h e southern
extremity of which is held by Belooch tribes, seem
to come to a sudden end to the south, at a point
between the 28th and 29th parallels of latitude.
There seems to be there a sort of retrocession of
the mountains. The high outer range disappears,
and the plain conntry takes a long stretch to the
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west. The Eolan pass, instead of running like the
others fop a couple of hundred miles through the
great outer barrier of mountains, 12,000 ft. to
16,000 ft . high, consists of a much shorter ascent
from the plains of Cutch-Gundava to the high
quasi-plateau country. The route from Shikarpore, near the Indus, to Dadar, at the foot of the
Bolan pass, though easy enough in winter (the
difficulty of obtaining carriage apart), is said to be
very hot and unhealthy in summer, and to be very
much flooded during the high Indus. But that
part of the route would easily be surmounted by a
not very expensive railway, which is certainly
quite necesvary if we are to make a permanent
advance in that direction. From Dadar upwards
the first part of the route seems to be very gradual,
and apparently there is only some thirty or forty
miles of considerable ascent to Quettah, which is
above the pass, at the height of 5500 ft. The
country through which the hilly part ,of this route
y sparsely inhapasses is a Belooch c o ~ ~ n t rvery
bited; and though not free from predatory habits,
the Belooches are much more tractable and easy to
manage than the Afghans. I n fact, we have
already both by treaty and by occupation complete
access to the Belooch country, and there ~ o u i dnot
be difficulty on that score. At Quettah we are in
our right ; in occupying it we have clone that
which we have full treaty right to do. That, at any
,rate, is s great ad~~antage.Whatever objections
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without our aid, let him do so; but establish him
not by our aid, for if that is done the hand of every
man in Afghanistan will be against him. This is
the real difficulty in any negotiations with Takoob.
No doubt poor Yakoob, in the unpleasant position
he holds, will readily enough agree to terms with
us ; but how is he to carry them out? If ever a
man was, he is between the devil and the deep
sea. If he makes terms with us, he has a11
Afghanistan against him ; if he does not, we are
prepared to overturn his. It is on that account
that I am very distrustful indeed of any arrangements which it may now be possible to make by
negotiations with Yakoob or any one else who may
take his place.
The last telegrams from India seem to indicate
that the Government have resolved to give up
Candahar and Jellalabad, and so to cut short the
occupation of two of the routes in a way which I
think very prudent, if the upper country is not
to be occupied { but there remains the Kurram
country, which General Roberts (no doubt acting
under Lord Lytton's instructions) took upon
himself t o annex without any authority from Her .
Majesty's Government, as we have been distinctly
told. It surely would be very weak indeed to
maintain our hold of most enlbarrassing positions
in order to support an act thus done without
authority. The whole question now hinges upon
that. So long as we insist on holding the Kurrarn
5 "

.

route, no anlicable settlement with the t#sibej
possible, and any pretended settlement will only
lead to fresli complicntions.
Yakoob is said to hare accepted our terms;
and many people jump to the conclusion that, this
done, everything is settled. On the contrary, that
is the beginning of difficulties. It rernni.11~for
Pakoob to assert his o m position-to go back to
Cabul and say, '' I have surrendered part of our
territory ; I have accepted the demand for
Residents ; I have yielded everything. Kom obey
me; and having obeyed me, help me to recover the
possessions of my father ~vhichhave re^-olted fro111
me, to defeat Abdoor Rahman and all other rirnls,
and to establish a stable government." I hardly
expect to see such things effected. However, rvc
shall soon see ; and if that fails, then our niorc
serioris difficulties will comnlerlce.

THE LAST RESORT.
Failing any arrangement of the kind vhich I
have just mentioned, I mould again say that in my
opinion the difficulties and expenses of an occupation of Afghanistan are so great that, rather that1
undertake a more extensive occupation, I would
Ieave the country to its fate, holding only Quettnh
and the mouth of the Ehyber, and, trusting to the
chapter of accidents. I would risk the difficulties
which rvould now no doubt attend this course rather
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than face the greater difficulties which an extended
occupation m u s t necessarily involve. But if this
may not be-if Her Maj esty's Government are not
prepared to retire to the line of the real Indian
frontier-then
in my view, far preferable to the
half-and-half plan of holding the several routes
through the most difficult and~troublesomeparts of
the country, would be the bolder, more thorough,
and Inore scientific measure of going beyond the
mountains and taldng up a position on the high
land stretching froin Cabul through Ghuznee to
Quettah. T h a t is what I understand to be
establishing a position beyond the mountain barrier,
as recommended by Lord Napier of Magdala and
others. Ghuznee, the culminating and commanding
point of this tract, is the old historical centre from
which the country has been commanded, so far as
any previous dynasty has really commanded it.
Prom the high line, of which Ghnznee is the centre,
no doubt a strong force would command the passes
from Central Asia on the one side, and in some
degree dominated and isolate the independent
Afghan tribes on the other side.
If we thus isolate, as it were, the country of the
independent tribes, then I think there is no reason
whatever why we should seek to deprive them of
their independence, and of those d'eenro~ocraticinstitutions which a r e their birthright. On the contrary, I
would encourage them to develope those indigenous
self-governing institutions, democratic though they

be, vhich form the ancient lam of the Afghan race.
Under the shadow of our external military protection I would foster those institutions and would
seek to establish an Afghan Republic or congeries
of Republics. It has always seemed strange to me
that we, who so much pride ourselves on our
popular institutions, appear to be the last to recognize anything of the kind among other peoples.
W e seem always in the habit of supposing that all
over the world the absolute power of despotic rule
is the natural state of things, though nothing can
be more contrary to the facts. Our conduct in
India, in Turkey, and in Egypt, seems to have
been throughout guided by that belief ; and in
Afghanistan, which is, as I have said, one of the
most democratic countries i n the world, the
greatest danger seems to be in the idea that if me
can only find or establish a kiug and come to
terms with him, a11 will be settled.' One mould
have thought, as I have already said, that our experience of 1641 might have cured us of that
delusion. So far then as regards all the country
east of Ghuznee, the course which I mould follow
is to isolate it and make it self-governing and
independent. I would hold the Bolan and Khyber
routes, but not the Kurram. The Goleree route
we might hope to keep open for mercantile purposes only. On the other hand, as regards all the
remainder of the country really Afghan, that is the
districts about Candahar and thence westward,
'
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consisting principally of the Durnnee country, my
T ~ C would
I ~
be that as these western tribes have
beell more sccustomed to some sort of kingly rule,
and the family of Dost >lil~homeclare now really
the chiefs of the Durnnees, I mould give every
facility to yalioob, or any other member of the
finnily who may be more acceptable to the people,
to establish himself as reigning chief of the
Iluranees, with the possessio~lof Cnudahar and all
the Durance districts and dependencies. Herat
is hardly properly included in these terms, but
that part of the valley of the Harirood seems
properly to belong to no other tribe or nationality,
and exposed ns it is to depredations by the hi11
men, it could hardly be independent ; so I mould
seek to make that also a dependency of the
IUuranee chief of' Cftndahrtr. With that chief I
mould rn:rke tho terms I hove before snggesteddomestic independence, but political depetldelice
zlyoll us.
At Cnbnl we should come illto close contact with
the IZol~istmeesand Hazarehs of the hill country
to the north and west, and might milre skparate
arra~lge~nents
directly with them ; as likewise with
the people of Baduksharl and the neighbouring
principalities, who are, ns I have esglained, of the
same Persian race as the Kohistanees. I ~vould
give to these countries the form of government
which the people are foulid to like best. Possibly
some of them might even prefer our rnle if fairly
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their rulers either in Afghanistan. or in Turkestan,
and probably might be brought to reasonable selfgovernment, in Eohistan and Badukshan, if they
are protected and encouraged.
1 have little doubt then that if me must advance
on Cabul and Ghuznee, and can find the finances
necessary for the maintenance of our position
there, we should really command the great
Caucasian barrier towards the north without
encountering those insuperable difficulties which
seem to attend the occupation of any properly
Afghan country.
I n the event of such an occupation of the
strategical positions in Afghanistan as I have contemplated in the last resort, I think we should proclaim that t o all those who can in any way
successfully govern themselves, we shall give selfgovernment in the form which is most acceptable
to each people, and that we shall ask them for no
revenue or tribute, and shall not interfere in their
domestic affairs, unless it be to arbitrate between
them either at their request or where internal
disorders render such interference absolutely
necessary. On the other hand, we may in some
sort bribe them into acpiescence, while utilizing
them for our own purposes, by offering to many of
them military and other serlice under ourselves.
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I hardly hope that the Afghans would settle
down as readily. No doubt they mould less
readily brook our interference; but grad~~ally
a
settlement might be effected, and I should not
despair that as they gain co~lfidenceand belief in
our desire to let them govern themselves for thek
own benefit, tlieir country might become accessible
to us like any other country.
The great difficulty of such a plan as I hare
proposed is of course the expense. That no doubt
would be very considerable. And we should
practically derive no revenue from the country, for
any little that we might collect from the few
.districts directly occupied by ourselves would be
expended on the local administration. For myself
I see no objection on principle to making India pay
for undertakings which are connected with India
and are in some sort intended for the benefit of
India. The mother country pays more than her
shwe of the expenses of the empire : me do what
we can for India, and India might fairly enough
pay her share if she only had the money ; but then,
as a matter of fact, she has not the money. Her
people are undoubtedly very poor. The more I
see of other countries, the more I realize the
poverty of India and the cruelty of taxing the
people more than me can help. The position of
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Izldiaxl finance is unfortunately such that there is
no hope of s surplus, and I do not see that we can
fairly raise more taxes in return for the oldfi~shionedstyle of govemmlent. If it be possible
still to raise some further rates or taxes, I think
that these should only be obtained, as has lately
been done, as a means of paying 'for additio~~al
benefits evident to the people, the money being, in
fact, expended by themselves. I f Afghanistan were
occupied in the way I have mentioned, some considerable saving might be effected in the military
expenses in India itself, Afghanistan being henceforth the frontier fortification by which India is
shielded and the troops there held ready to send
to India, in case of an emergency. The money
thus saved in India would be a fair contribution
towards the expense of Afghanistan; but no more
than this could be derived from India, and any
further expenses England mould have to piy.
But after all, this is a rich country, not very
heavily taxed; and if we mould really have a
spirited foreign policy, great foreign dominions,
and a ' strong military position, I believe that the
occupation of Afghanistan mould be an important
step t o m d s that object. I speak of the permanent position of this country apart from the
present depression ; for after all, despite the
depression of our industries, me still have capital
-money is cheap-the
yield of the income-tax
does not fail. We still are, md may hope to

remain, the money-lenders of the world. We can
bear ell enough another penny in the pound
upon property if we mould have the great position
I have mentioned.
I t is better, too, that -ive should honestly realize
the fact that whether from the inherent difficulties
of our position, or whether from not fully and
properly carlying out the system adopted, our
present military arrangements are a faillure ; or, at
any rate, even if me have made a successf~~l
commencement of the plan of increasing our resenes
at home, they are a failure as regards foreign service. The difficulty of supplying a great army in
India under the short-service system has never
been fairly faced; and on the occurrence of the
Iate African emergency there has been made painfully manifest our entire failure to keep even a
few battalions in an efficient state as the next on
the roster for foreign service. On the other hand,
since the mutiny we have been afraid to employ
too many Indian soldiers. We really have not a,
great native army in India as compared to the
country, and the greater part of what me have is
not really efficient for severe or foreign service.
So it is that having one war. on our hands in India,
me have been obliged to send heavy dragoons and
imperfect regiments of English boys to Africa
instead of the light Indian regiments, which, with
a nucleus of Europeans, would have been far
better fitted for the service. Afghanistan would
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huh1 our prescnt position in Afghanistnn ; that rye
re:dly nmst citllrr go back or g o forward. I an1
collriliccll th:it to crlt:lniglc ourselves in the tliost
diflitbult part of the hills, and to hold a succession
01' n ~rltcstl~rougbt hosc hills ~ ~ i t h o uholding
t
the
high ln~ldsnhovc, is qrlitc the worst policy of dl.
lislwt1i:rlly I tliilik tlmt tllc occlipntiorl of Iiurrixm
Ji host :nu1 thc so-c:~lleclroutc! that rvny to C:L)JIII,in
thr! vcrv l u w t and centre of the real Afg1i:inistnn
uf thc Sfghnnr;, and surrounded by t*he rnost
troal,lesoinc of t h e independent tribcs, ~ ~ o o bc
ld
thie greatest possible rnistqke. Let us choose then
orit? of two nlternntirc plans-an
Indian or an
Afglla~~hnll
frontier. hl the one case we m t ~ a tconecntrstc our forces and call off' General Roberts,
lye niust riot irritate, but conciliate the tribes; and
if me are not to surround and isolate them, the best
solution is t o leave then1 alone as much as possible,
and not push ourselres among them. I n that case,
still holding Quettah. let us try again, if we will,
the possibility of an Bfgbnn s h t e sucli as that of
stiln
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cw i s very decidedly that me
:ompEcation and disturbance
ion in Afghanistan ; .that we
back or go forward. I am
:angle ourselves in the most
ills, and to hold a succession
se hills without holding the
yite the worst policy of all.
t the occupation of Kurram
!d route that way to Cabul, in
l t r e of the real Afghanistan
1 surrounded by the most
ndependent tribes, would be
uistake. Let us choose then
iye plans-an Indian or an
the one case we must connd call off General Roberts.
jjut conciliate the tribes; and
~ n and
d isolate them, the best
?m alone as much as possible,
8 imong them. In that cage,
let us try again, if we will,
ifghfin state such as that of.

the lnte Wlere Ali, claiming to ourselves only
access to Ball& an8 the other terms which I have
mentiotled. Failing that armngement - md I
greatly fear that it must fail,-then f-or my part I
would leave Afghanistnn alone, and see ~h-hntmay
come. If that may not be, then I come to the
pla11 which I ha\-e described as c L The Lnst
Resort," that is, do not try to coilquer the independent tribes, but isolate them, and protect the111
in the exercise of their indigenous institutio~~s.
Give up the played-out ltingdonl of Cabul, 31111
boldly take up a central and comumnding positioll
en the high ground about Ghuznee and Cabbul,
com~nunlicat~ingwith I~~cldisby the Bolnn n11tl
I<.hyber routes. Let us then put ourselves iu
direct comu~u~ication
with the nlorc aulennble
peoples beyond our positions, coilt yo1 them, secure
our frontier, and add new races of soldiers to our
army. If this must be done, it is probably better
that it sho~lldbe clone so011 than later.
Such a policy mould no doubt be a fine, I mny
say-s
ma,@ficent
game. Holding India in s
stronger and more dignified may, if our possessioll
of part of Burmah should some day involve n
further adrnnce i n that direction, rye should haTe
the necessary troops. If events are really tending
to foyce upon us a great African empire, we might
draw from our Asiatic possessions the troops best
fitted for skch an undertaking. And if me nmst
hold a, great positlion in the Xediterranean, me

lilig,.lithasc a Lctter chance of doing so than n-hell.
hst p a r , we seut n sitlglc tlirision of native trool~r
there. Such n policy ~ ~ o u li tnlr o l ~ ~the
e abando11~ncrlt of h:df measures- it would bc intelligible
c.llonyrl4 nud rtliglit be temptiug enou yh-bu t it lllust
Ire :m espc.usive and risky policy. I only throw it
~ t l 3t s tlic oltenlntire to be co~lsicleredin the lrcry
1 s t . I all1 IIIJ-SPUnll for econo1113', pence, and
tl~ti~
:kt t home, nlld ~vouldonly seek to hold indin
h~ long as we cnxl do so wi-itllout Leing forced into
:u.ulritioos pnljects i~cydnd the Indim i~orctcrs.
l hat ~ir-ilsluy view in 18-49,and that is my view
I
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